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IMPORTING INDIAN INTOLERANCE:
HOW TITLE VII CAN PREVENT
CASTE DISCRIMINATION IN THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE
Brett Whitley*
If Hindus migrate to other regions on [E]arth, [Indian]
Caste would become a world problem.
— Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (1916)1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine it is the year 2020. You are one of the more than
160 million people across India that are labeled as Dalits,
formerly known as the “Untouchables.” Most Hindus view Dalits
as belonging to the lowest rung in the ancient system of social
stratification that impacts individuals across the globe called the
caste system.2 Your people have endured human rights abuses
for centuries, but luckily, neither you nor a loved one have ever
been the victim of one of the thousands of horrendous crimes such
as assault, rape, or murder committed against your people each
year.3 Even so, you have never felt safe, especially when
*
The author would first like to thank his advisor to this Comment, mentor, and friend—
Dean Cynthia Nance. Without Dean Nance thoughtfully incorporating present-day issues
into her Employment Law class, the author likely would not have encountered this important
topic. Next, the author would like to show gratitude to Dr. Suraj Yengde for taking the time
to enlighten the author about the complexities of caste discrimination using his own personal
experiences as well as the experiences of so many others. Finally, the author would like to
thank his parents, Teresa and Rick Whitley, as well as his sister, Alexis Whitley, for all their
unconditional love and support.
1. M. ZWICK-MAITREYI ET AL., CASTE IN THE UNITED STATES: A SURVEY OF CASTE
AMONG SOUTH ASIAN AMERICANS 4 (Equality Labs 2018), [https://perma.cc/JW3G-V9JG].
2. What is India’s Caste System?, BBC NEWS (June 19, 2019), [https://perma.cc/9B7FBKAN].
3. Hillary Mayell, India’s “Untouchables” Face Violence, Discrimination, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (June 2, 2003), [https://perma.cc/9D9Y-FBU7] (“Statistics compiled by
India’s National Crime Records Bureau indicate that in the year 2000, the last year for which
figures were available, 25,455 crimes were committed against Dalits. Every hour two Dalits
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newspaper headlines read: “Dalit [] beaten to death for plucking
flowers;” “Dalit tortured by cops for three days;” or “Dalit woman
gang-raped, paraded naked.”4 Despite your fears, you have
persevered throughout school due to India’s affirmative action
plan, or “compensatory discrimination” program.5 You wish not
only to escape the country that is hostile to your caste, but to also
obtain a job outside of the realm of undesirable occupations to
which Dalits are ordinarily limited.6 To your delight, you obtain
a respectable job working for a tech giant in the United States.
However, you quickly learn that the caste discrimination you
faced at home transcends borders.
At your new job, you begin to associate with your upper
caste coworkers who also immigrated from India. After a short
conversation about where you went to school in India and your
last name, your Dalit status is apparent, and your coworkers and
supervisors input limitations for you based on your caste. From
that point onward, you “receive[] less pay, fewer opportunities,
and other inferior terms and conditions of employment . . . .”7
This is no imaginary tale. It is the story of an anonymous
Dalit employee who sought to bring a Title VII claim based on
caste discrimination against his employer, CISCO.8 Importantly,
he is not alone. It may be difficult to ever know how many Dalits
are currently in the United States because they fear that their caste

are assaulted; every day three Dalit women are raped, two Dalits are murdered, and two Dalit
homes are torched.”).
4. Id.
5. M. Varn Chandola, Affirmative Action in India and the United States: The
Untouchable and Black Experience, 3 IND. INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 101, 109 (1992). Such
affirmative action programs reserve admission in institutions of higher education for Dalits
and other disadvantaged classes of people.
6. Shambhavi Raj Singh, #DalitLivesMatter: Why Are Atrocities Against Dalits On
The Rise?, FEMINISM IN INDIA (June 11, 2020), [https://perma.cc/Q6FB-HD67] (“Even
today, more than 90% of the employees in the sanitation and cleaning sector are Dalits.”);
see also Jeremy Sarkin & Mark Koenig, Ending Caste Discrimination in India: Human
Rights and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Individuals and Groups from Discrimination
at the Domestic and International Levels, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 541, 550 (2010)
(“Most Dalit people are still landless agricultural laborers today, just as they have been for
centuries.”).
7. Complaint at 3, Cal. Dep’t Fair Emp. & Hous. v. CISCO Sys., Inc., No. 5:20-cv04374-NC (N.D. Cal. 2020) (dismissed), [https://perma.cc/5PC4-TEQW].
8. Id. at 1-2.
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can be revealed, or in other words, “outed.”9 However, there are
concrete numbers that in 2003 only 1.5% of Indian immigrants in
the United States were Dalit or lower caste, leaving them vastly
outnumbered in comparison to the total 2.5 million people of
Indian descent who lived in the United States at the time.10 It may
also be useful to compare the 2003 figures in the United States to
statistics in South Asia regarding Dalit demographics to get an
idea about disproportionate Dalit representation. A 2016 survey
found that in some South Asian countries “Dalits represent an
average of 15-18% of the population and Brahmins, the highest
ranking caste, [represent] approximately 3-4%.”11
Heinous crimes like sexual assault or murder are the most
extreme products of caste discrimination and should warrant the
most attention, but the effects of caste discrimination are not
limited to these crimes. There are many other, less apparent ways
in which a biased upper caste supervisor may remind Dalit and
lower caste employees that they are inferior, therefore upholding
the caste hierarchy that exists so prevalently in their home country
of India. Whether the biased supervisor torments a Dalit or lower
caste employee with caste-related jokes or takes his or her
discriminatory goals a step further by making it his or her mission
to limit the success of Dalits or lower caste employees, the
supervisor’s actions are the product of the caste system.
As Indian immigration to the United States continues to
grow exponentially,12 the tech industry has become “increasingly
dependent on Indian workers.”13 Further, as more lower caste and
Dalit individuals benefit from India’s affirmative action programs
and welfare schemes, Dalits and lower caste individuals now have
the increased opportunity to become skilled employees and
immigrate to the United States. As the United States becomes
increasingly more dependent on South Asian, and especially
9. ZWICK-MAITREYI ET AL., supra note 1, at 16-17 (50% of all Dalit respondents who
live in the United States stated that they live in fear of their Caste being “outed”).
10. Tinku Ray, No Escape from Caste on These Shores, ‘Untouchables’ from India
Say, PULITZER CTR. (Feb. 26, 2019), [https://perma.cc/2WN7-S72J].
11. ZWICK-MAITREYI ET AL., supra note 1, at 17.
12. NEIL G. RUIZ, INDIAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. 6 (Pew Research Center 2018),
[https://perma.cc/KY9Z-3525].
13. AB Wire, India’s Engineers and its Caste System Thrive in Silicon Valley: Report,
AM. BAZAAR (Oct. 28, 2020, 7:08 PM), [https://perma.cc/EY8F-FYE5].
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Indian, workers, more and more Dalit and lower caste individuals
have found themselves coming to the United States for gainful
employment. This growing dependency on workers who come
from differing caste backgrounds paired with the caste system’s
entrenched place in Hindu culture suggests that caste
discrimination in the United States workplace is likely to get
worse, especially in Indian-dominant industries such as the tech
sector.14 Though most Americans may not know the role caste
plays in Hindu culture, caste discrimination is very much an
“American problem.”15 Whether it is the American employer
seeking to eliminate discrimination in the workplace or the Dalit
employees seeking a better life, there is legislation that can
protect Dalit and lower caste employees—Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
This Comment begins in Part I with an overview of the caste
system and its origins. In Part II, this Comment demonstrates
how caste discrimination in employment contexts constrains
social mobility. Parts III and IV include the crux of my
proposal—the theory of Intersectionality shows that caste
discrimination is prohibited under Title VII by recognizing that
caste discrimination is simultaneous discrimination based upon
one’s existence in multiple protected classes. After establishing
caste’s coverage under Title VII, this Comment narrows its focus
to how a victim of caste discrimination may bring a claim under
Title VII in Part V. Lastly, in Part VI, this Comment provides
proposals specific to legislative bodies, employers, and most
importantly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). Such proposals contend that legislative bodies,
employers, and the EEOC should create caste-centric policies and
interpretations that specifically prohibit caste discrimination
instead of attempting to shape caste so that it fits into just one of
Title VII’s protected classes. Overall, these proposals would

14. See Nitasha Tiku, India’s Engineers Have Thrived in Silicon Valley. So Has its
Caste System., WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/8HMR-U798] (“[A] nonprofit
advocacy group for Dalit rights, received complaints about caste from nearly 260 U.S. tech
workers in three weeks . . . .”).
15. Telephone Interview with Dr. Suraj Yengde, Assoc., Dep’t of Afr. & Afr. Am.
Stud., Harvard Univ. (Oct. 19, 2020).
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show courts that there is support for prohibiting caste
discrimination in the American workplace.
It is also important to note that this Comment is not the only
work that addresses the possibility of caste discrimination being
covered by Title VII. Guha Krishnamurthi and Charanya
Krishnaswami authored a preliminary draft titled Caste and Title
VII to discuss the possible prohibition of caste discrimination in
the American workplace. This work thoughtfully applies the
authors’ expertise on the caste system to what we know about
Title VII’s protected classes in order to determine whether caste
discrimination is discrimination based on one or more of the
protected classes.16 Similar to this Comment, Caste and Title VII
contends that caste discrimination is a legally cognizable claim
under Title VII because “in light of the Supreme Court’s teaching
in Bostock v. Clayton County, caste discrimination is cognizable
as race discrimination, religious discrimination, and national
origin discrimination.”17 This Comment also discusses how and
why caste discrimination is discrimination based upon the
protected classes. Additionally, this Comment seeks to add to the
current scholarship by discussing the use of the theory of
Intersectionality when arguing Title VII’s coverage of caste.
This Comment adds to the current scholarship by describing
how caste discrimination can be at least based in part upon one’s
membership in all of Title VII’s protected classes. However, this
Comment does not list options, or in this case, protected classes,
that a court may choose to recognize caste discrimination as
falling under. Instead, this Comment contends that, under the
theory of Intersectionality, not only can courts recognize caste
discrimination as being discrimination based either on one’s race,
religion, color, sex, or national origin, courts should recognize
caste discrimination as simultaneous discrimination based
potentially on one’s existence in all of the protected classes.18
Importantly, Caste and Title VII does not deny the possibility that
16. See generally Guha Krishnamurthi & Charanya Krishnaswami, Title VII and Caste
Discrimination, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 456 (2021).
17. Id. at 481.
18. The word “potentially” is only included due to the fact that there is only a potential
chance that the protected class of sex is going to be implicated since there is only a potential
chance that one is a woman—the most likely gender to be harmed by caste discrimination.
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the theory of Intersectionality should be used in arguing that caste
discrimination is covered by Title VII. Ultimately, while this
Comment and Caste and Title VII are similar in many aspects,
such as the overarching argument that caste discrimination is
prohibited by Title VII, the two works reach this conclusion in
different ways.
I. CASTE: AN OVERVIEW
In this Part, the Comment first gives a general overview of
the caste system. Next, this Part provides a brief background of
the development of today’s caste system. Finally, this Part
connects the caste system to one’s ability to be upwardly mobile
in society via employment.
A. What is caste?
Caste is a system of religious purity.19 One inherits this
religious purity at birth from which there is no mobility. The caste
system strictly prohibits “varnasankara,” or the mixture of varnas,
restricting “inter-dining and inter-marriage.”20 The varnas are an
“ancient fourfold arrangement of socioeconomic categories.”21
The varnas, listed in order of religious purity are the Brahmins
(“priests, scriptural knowledge-keepers, and legislators”), the
Kshatriyas (“kings and warriors”), the Vaishyas (merchants), and
the Shudras (peasants).22
The caste system effectively separates people spiritually,
politically, economically, and even physically, denying Dalits
access to land ownership, schooling, places of worship, hospitals,

19. M.V. Nadkarni, Is Caste System Intrinsic to Hinduism? Demolishing a Myth, 38
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4783, 4783 (Nov. 8, 2003).
20. Id.
21. T.N. Madan, Varnas, BRITANNICA, [https://perma.cc/A9SZ-S82X] (last visited
Feb. 17, 2021).
22. ZWICK-MAITREYI, ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
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water sources,23 markets, and other public places.24 One’s level
of purity decides his/her varna. Hindu origin myths state that the
four varnas “were created from different parts of God Brahma’s
body and were to be ranked hierarchically according to ritual
status, purity, and occupation.”25 Hinduism considers the Dalits,
meaning “broken but resilient,” and the Adivasis, or the
indigenous peoples of South Asia, outside the four-caste group
structure making up the varnas described above, which means that
both groups are considered to be of the utmost impurity.26
B. When did caste-based hierarchy begin?
Caste-based hierarchy is thousands of years old, making it
one of the oldest systems of social discrimination in the world.27
Despite the caste system’s historical roots, there is much debate
within Hindu society as to whether the caste system is integral to
Hinduism.28 The differences in belief are a result of differing
interpretations of ancient Hindu scripture.
Those who believe caste is integral to Hinduism believe that
the caste system is religiously codified in ancient Hindu

23. See, e.g., Susie Sell, Access to Clean Water: How Dalit Communities in India are
Fighting for Change, GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2013), [https://perma.cc/657W-LBTP] (“Dalits
usually have little other option in urban areas than to cram into the already crowded slums,
where their access to clean, safe water and sanitation is often severely limited. Many still
get their water from dirty shallow wells, or illegally from leaks in the city’s piped water
supply.”).
24. Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 6, at 543 (quoting Comm. on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reps. Submitted By States Parties Under Article 9
of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: Inda, 3, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/IND/CO/19 (2007)).
25. ZWICK-MAITREYI, ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
26. Id.; see also India: Adivasis, MINORITY RTS. GRP. INT’L, [https://perma.cc/HAS3LYWV] (last visited Apr. 1, 2021) (“Adivasis are not a homogenous group; there are over
200 distinct peoples speaking more than 100 languages and varying greatly in ethnicity and
culture. However, there are similarities in their way of life and generally perceived
oppressed position within Indian society. According to the official Census held in 2011,
Adivasis constitute 8.6 percent of the nation’s total population, some 104.3 million people.”).
27. What is India’s Caste System?, supra note 2.
28. Nadkarni, supra note 19, at 4784; see Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 6, at 548-49
(“Mahatma Gandhi argued, ‘[C]aste has nothing to do with religion. It is a custom whose
origin I do not know and do not need to know for the satisfaction of my spiritual hunger.’”)
(quoting SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS REFORM: THE HINDUS OF BRITISH INDIA 199-200 (Amiya
P. Sen ed., 2003)).

5 WHITLEY.MAN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

170

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

4/13/22 10:01 AM

Vol. 75:1

scripture.29 However, those who oppose this belief argue that the
importance of caste is a relatively new idea developed during
British colonial rule—at a time when access to information was
scarce and censored through the colonizer’s perspective.30
There are many reasons why one may continue to believe
that the caste system is integral to Hinduism, despite other,
explicitly contradictory interpretations of the Hindu canon.31 For
one, those who support the interpretation that favors the caste
system’s legitimacy have the most to lose. Understandably, those
who are in power do not want to relinquish their power nor the
power their children inherit. Supporters of the interpretation that
favors the caste system’s legitimacy may argue that the caste
system provides a stable, organized system of labor that avoids
the overexploitation of resources by only allowing certain castes
to reap the benefits of certain resources.32
Before British colonialism reached India, those who would
now be defined as Hindu existed without a unified collective
religious identity.33 During the age of British colonial expansion,
the colonizers quickly developed an awareness that the diversity
of cultures and religions would require cognizable categories that
would be comparable to the normative Christian perspective.34
This perspective supports a system of “an absolute claim for only
one truth, of a powerful church dominating society, and
consequently of fierce religious and social confrontation with
members of other creeds.”35 Operating in accord with this
normative Christian perspective, the British held a preconceived
29. ZWICK-MAITREYI, ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
30. Sanjoy Chakravorty, Viewpoint: How the British Reshaped India’s Caste System,
BBC NEWS (June 19, 2019), [https://perma.cc/HJ3D-U4AW].
31. See Nadkarni, supra note 19, at 4785-88.
32. Id. at 4790 (“It was easier for skills and knowledge to be imparted within family
from father to children as there were no trade schools . . . [a]s families became specialised in
arts and crafts, they flourished . . . .”); Id. (“The caste system performed an important
function of reducing competition for and avoiding overexploitation of natural resources.
Only fisherman caste could go for fishing . . . [o]nly hunters’ caste could go for hunting
wildlife in the forests . . . .”).
33. Ben Heath, The Impact of European Colonialism on the Indian Caste System, EINT’L RELS. (Nov. 26, 2012), [https://perma.cc/9J4L-WNU2].
34. RICHARD KING, ORIENTALISM AND RELIGION: POSTCOLONIAL THEORY, INDIA
AND ‘THE MYTHIC EAST’ 99 (1999).
35. Id. at 103 (quoting HINDUISM RECONSIDERED 14-15 (Günther-Dietz Sontheimer
& Hermann Kulke eds., 1991)).
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notion that Hinduism was the one religion that unified India
despite the diversity of cultures and religions that the British knew
existed in India.36 This Christian perspective also led the British
to look to Indian literary works, as well as the proclaimed experts
of such works, as sources for understanding Indian culture.37
In such an age, only one group held such expertise—the
Brahmins. Accompanying this expertise, the Brahmins already
had great social, economic, and political power, placing them in
a position where they could serve as the sole source of
information regarding Hinduism. Specifically, the Brahmins
influenced the British interpretation of these texts by emphasizing
brahmanical beliefs “as central and foundational to the ‘essence’
of Hinduism.”38
And most importantly, the Brahmins’
interpretations supported the Christian/Western tradition of “an
absolute claim for only one truth, [in] a powerful church
dominating society.”39 The British, by following the Brahmins’
interpretations, understood that Hinduism “represent[ed] the
triumph of universalized, brahmanical forms of religion over the
‘tribal’ and the ‘local’ [religions] . . . .”40 Through the Brahmins’
interpretations, the “British found a loosely defined cultural élite
that proved amenable to an ideology that placed [the Brahmins]
at the apex of a single world-religious tradition.”41 With this
information, the British could now classify Hindus under a single,
social construct, effectively making colonial control and
manipulation easier.
To officially begin solidifying this emerging form of
Hinduism which, at its core is nothing more than a textual theory
called “Brahmanism,” the British elevated Brahman-Sanskrit
texts like the Manusmriti to canonical status in the 19th Century
by deeming these texts the authentic sources of knowledge
regarding Hindus.42 The Manusmriti is now regarded as the most
36. Id. at 107.
37. Id. at 101.
38. Id. at 103.
39. KING, supra note 34 (quoting HINDUISM RECONSIDERED 14-15 (Günther-Dietz
Sontheimer & Hermann Kulke eds., 1991)).
40. Id. at 104.
41. Id. at 103.
42. See Padmanabh Samarendra, Census in Colonial India and the Birth of Caste, 46
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 51, 54 (2011) (“The colonial officials like William Jones and Henry
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authoritative book on Hindu law and “acknowledges and justifies
the caste system as the basis of order and regularity of society.”43
The caste system was further institutionalized in India during
“the mid to late 19th Century through the census.”44 The census
was a direct survey of the population of India. The administrators
of the census went to the people of India with questionnaires to
inquire about their number, attributes, and where they fit within
the fourfold varna divisions described in the Brahmin texts.45
However, the administrators were met with great difficulty in
accomplishing this task, finding instead that a strict fourfold varna
division was “non-existent” throughout India.46 Despite this lack
of uniformity, similar census projects continued in an effort to
organize colonial India.47 As similar processes unfolded over
time, Indians began to associate their national and cultural
identity with this view of Hinduism. When India became
independent in 1947, this view of Hinduism, that originated from
the colonizers and Brahmins, was already solidified. Although
the British and Brahmins shaped modern-day Hinduism, modernday Hindu scholars sometimes categorize the same texts “very
differently,” placing emphasis on the multitude of other
Sanskritic texts that serve as the basis of Indian culture.48
C. How does caste limit social mobility via occupations and
employment?
Although caste and India are colloquially associated with
each other, the concept of untouchability is not at all confined to
the 160 million Dalits located in India.49 Approximately ninety
million additional Dalits suffer caste discrimination abuses in
other Asian countries as well as other parts of the world, such as
Colebrook, writing from towards the close of the 18th century, considered Sanskrit texts as
the authentic sources of knowledge about the Hindus.”).
43. What is India’s Caste System?, supra note 2.
44. Chakravorty, supra note 30.
45. Id.
46. Samarendra, supra note 42, at 57.
47. Id.
48. See Chakravorty, supra note 30.
49. Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 6, at 543; see also Mayell, supra note 3 (describing
India’s Dalit population and the effects of untouchability).

5 WHITLEY.MAN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

IMPORTING INDIAN INTOLERANCE

4/13/22 10:01 AM

173

Europe and North America.50 While international actors have
addressed the issues of caste discrimination and untouchability
since the 1990s,51 the “international community has failed to
[monitor] the progress of the Indian government and others in
addressing these abuses.”52 Article 17 of the Indian Constitution
has abolished the practice of untouchability and “Article 15
prohibits discrimination and mentions caste discrimination as one
type of discrimination that is no longer permissible.”53 However,
“despite formal protections in law, discriminatory treatment
remains endemic and discriminatory societal norms continue to
be reinforced by government and private structures, often through
violent means.”54 Smita Narula, an esteemed caste scholar and
professor of law, even goes so far as to compare caste to “oxygen”
in Indian society because both are “invisible and indispensable.”55
Poverty is deceptive, leading an observer to believe that it
affects all who suffer from it equally. While lack of upward
mobility is not limited to Dalits and lower caste people, the truth
of the matter is that “if you are a Dalit in India, you are far more
likely to be poor” and “the poverty endured is abject, violent, and

50. See, e.g., Anushiya Shrestha et al., The Hydro-Social Dynamics of Exclusion and
Water Insecurity of Dalits in Peri-Urban Kathmandu Valley, Nepal: Fluid yet Unchanging,
28 CONTEMP. S. ASIA 320, 326 (2020) (“Without land, with limited education and few capital
assets, livelihood options are limited for Dalits [in Nepal].”); KALINGA TUDOR SILVA ET AL.,
INDIAN INST. OF DALIT STUD., CASTE DISCRIMINATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SRI
LANKA: AN OVERVIEW 17-19 (Sukhadeo Thorat & Surinder S. Jodka eds., 2009) (study
demonstrating that among many difficulties faced by some lower castes in Sri Lanka, lower
castes in different areas face limited access to “religious and ritual spheres,” difficulty in
securing land from high caste landowners, poor access to water and sanitation facilities, and
are degraded to “unclean work”); see also Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 6, at 543.
51. See Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 6, 563-64 (“[Since India’s independence in 1947]
a number of international treaties and findings by treaty bodies require that India properly
address caste discrimination. The ICERD [occurring in 1965] is most applicable . . . . Other
applicable treaties include the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) [occurring in 1966], the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) [occurring in 1966], the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
[occurring in 1989], and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) [occurring in 1979].”).
52. Id. at 544.
53. Id. at 556; see also Citizens for Just. & Peace, Caste Discrimination and Related
Laws in India, CJP (Jan. 25, 2018), [https://perma.cc/C2WT-E8WH].
54. Smita Narula, Equal by Law, Unequal by Caste: The “Untouchable” Condition
Critical Race Perspective, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 255, 257 (2008).
55. Id. at 259.
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virtually inescapable.”56 Though some Dalits have the privilege
of escaping such poverty, they have had no luck in escaping caste
discrimination in the American workplace. Dalits’ inability to
escape caste discrimination in the workplace is reflected not only
through the occasional snide remark, but also in limitations in
upward, social mobility.57 It is easy to see why such limitations
would exist in the workplace because one’s job is a prerequisite
for development in India as well as most, if not all, other countries
across the globe.58
These limitations, in turn, further
institutionalize the caste system “because of its capacity not only
to monitor the movements of groups, but also to regulate the
occupational map of the society.”59
This lack of upward mobility can be illustrated by looking at
a study evaluating the relationship between caste and occupation
in Pune, India. Pune is “traditionally known for the dominance
of the upper castes and their spread to various upper occupational
locations.”60 The study reflects that this tradition has for the most
part, continued to hold true in the twenty-first century. In 2007,
54% of upper caste earners were in the higher occupations while
32% of Dalits engage in “[v]ery poor” occupations, an 8%
increase from the year 2000.61 The study broadly classifies
occupations into upper or higher, upper middle, middle, lower
middle, poor or low, and very poor or very low. These
occupational categories “implicitly refer to ideas of status
attached to various occupations, opportunities for generating
wealth and requirement of knowledge skills/technical skills or
mere physical labour.”62 Thus a “very poor” occupation would
likely involve “mere physical labour,” while an “upper”

56. Id. at 268.
57. See ZWICK-MAITREYI ET AL., supra note 1, at 20.
58. Kaivan Munshi, The Impact of Caste on Economic Mobility in India, MINT (Aug.
16, 2017, 8:37 AM), [https://perma.cc/ZMG6-2WUZ] (“Economic mobility is a prerequisite
for development.”).
59. Rajeshwari Deshpande & Suhas Palshikar, Occupational Mobility: How Much
Does Caste Matter?, 43 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 61, 66 (2008).
60. Id. at 64.
61. Id.; see also Narula, supra note 54, at 285 (“Eighty-five percent of Dalits live in
rural areas while over 75 percent of Dalits perform land-connected work; 25 percent as
marginal or small farmers and over 50 percent as landless laborers . . . .”).
62. Deshpande & Palshikar, supra note 59, at 63.
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occupation would likely involve knowledge skills/technical
skills.63
While this study also shows Dalits as the most upwardly
mobile over the last four generations, it is important to note where
the Dalits started. To illustrate further, the upper caste has not
been as upwardly mobile as the Dalits have been over the last four
generations, but the upper castes already hold the highest
occupations. Essentially, the upper castes have, for the most part,
already reached the occupational peak, while the Dalits started
from the lowest point. In other words, “[t]here is a difference in
moving upwards from a middle occupational location and from a
very low occupational location.”64 Most importantly, the findings
of this study conclude “for purposes of upward movement, caste
matters.”65 Indeed, this conclusion is the reason why it is
included in this Comment. In order to realize how a biased
supervisor discriminating against an employee of a lower caste
violates Title VII, one must first realize how “[c]enturies of sociophysical segregation and illiteracy compromise [lower caste
individuals’] position[s] in today’s economy and society.”66
With this background in mind, it is easy to imagine how
entrenched Indian norms like caste discrimination can transcend
borders and persist in the American workplace despite legislative
efforts in India and on the international stage to combat caste
discrimination. Claims of caste discrimination are most prevalent
in South Asian-dominant sectors, such as the tech sector.67 In
fact, a 2018 survey of South Asians in the United States found
that 67% of Dalits reported being discriminated against at their
workplace due to their caste.68 However, few South Asian
employees actually raise their concerns of caste discrimination to
their American employers because they believe “their concerns
63. Id.
64. Id. at 65.
65. Id. at 66.
66. Rajnish Kumar et al., Social and Economic Inequalities: Contemporary
Significance of Caste in India, ECON. & POL. WKLY., 55, 56, (2009).
67. AB Wire, supra note 13 (investigating high rates of claims for caste discrimination
in tech companies, with a nonprofit advocacy group in 2020 receiving a number of such
claims from Facebook (33), Cisco (24), Google (20), Microsoft (18), IBM (17), and Amazon
(14) employees).
68. ZWICK-MAITREYI ET AL., supra note 1, at 20.
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will not be given weight” due to Americans’ lack of
understanding of caste dynamics or will lead to “negative
consequences to their career.”69 In some cases, lower caste
individuals do not even make it past the interview process when
searching for jobs in America when another Indian is the
interviewer.70 Though lower caste individuals in the United
States are likely to be skilled workers71 who have achieved greater
upward mobility in comparison to the majority of lower caste
individuals in India, lower caste individuals, regardless of what
job they have, face caste discrimination that limits their
advancement. For instance, a Dalit surgeon expressed that though
he was a member of the Legislative Assembly and a microsurgeon
specializing in hand and spinal reconstruction, he still “remain[s]
very much a dalit . . . open to routine humiliation from the upper
castes.”72
II. HOW DID TITLE VII COME TO BE?
In the 1960’s, African Americans faced significant
inequality in American society. In 1964, Congress finally took
measures to combat such inequality through the enaction of the
monumental Civil Rights Act.73 However, Congress also realized
that in order to truly achieve the goals of the Civil Rights Act—
to integrate African Americans into mainstream society—
Congress would have to fight discrimination not only in public
accommodations, schools, and voting, but also in the realm of
employment.
The notion that one’s employment opens (or closes) many
doors for his future is as true today as it was in 1964—when the
Civil Rights Act was enacted. In 1962, the rate of unemployment
was 124% higher for nonwhite Americans in comparison to the
69. Id.
70. Tiku, supra note 14 (“In more than 100 job interviews for contract work over the
past 20 years, Kaila said he only got one job offer when another Indian interviewed him in
person.”).
71. See Sonia Paul, When Caste Discrimination Comes To The United States, NPR
(Apr. 25, 2018), [https://perma.cc/3WJL-RADD] (“Today, India alone routinely attracts the
majority of skilled worker visas the US allots to foreign nationals . . . .”).
72. Narula, supra note 54, at 266.
73. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
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white rate; and the trend worsened as unskilled and semi-skilled
jobs that African Americans traditionally held were rapidly
disappearing due to the growth of automation.74 It was clear that
Congress needed to address this lack of opportunity and the
practices that imposed these limitations on African Americans in
order to successfully integrate African Americans into
mainstream society.
Congress’s answer to the problems that African Americans
faced in the employment realm was the equal employment
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).75
Congress enacted these provisions to prohibit discrimination
against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.76 Specifically, it is unlawful for employers:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or
employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.77

“[E]mployer” under Title VII means “a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any
agent of such a person.”78 Just as Title VII was initially enacted
to combat discrimination in the workplace against African
Americans in 1964, Title VII can also be used to protect Dalit and
lower caste employees from potential discriminators in

74. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Title VII Race or National Origin Discrimination in
Employment—Supreme Court Cases, 182 A.L.R. Fed. 61 § 2(a) (2002).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
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employment agencies, labor organizations, training programs,
and in many more aspects of employment.79
Broadly, Title VII’s purpose is to create a nondiscriminatory workplace. This purpose is advanced when
employers take preemptive measures to avoid discrimination like
adopting anti-discrimination policies, implementing effective
grievance mechanisms, and following the EEOC’s guidance on
Title VII. Importantly, courts hold that in order to carry out the
“purposes of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness
and humiliation of . . . discrimination,” Title VII must be
accorded a liberal construction.80 The fact that courts must accord
Title VII a liberal construction is significant to this Comment’s
proposal because though caste is not specifically listed as—or is
not easily pigeonholed into—a protected class, these
circumstances alone should not restrict courts from interpreting
Title VII to cover caste.
III. HOW CAN CASTE BE CLASSIFIED UNDER
TITLE VII?
Now that the background and goals of Title VII are apparent,
this Comment demonstrates why courts should recognize that
Title VII prohibits caste discrimination. This Comment argues
that the method described below gives potential victims of caste
discrimination the best opportunity to obtain relief and prevent
future caste discrimination in the workplace. Specifically, this
Comment proposes that the theory of Intersectionality offers the
best solution to prohibiting caste discrimination under Title VII.
By recognizing that caste cannot fit within only one protected
class and instead, simultaneously overlaps into multiple protected
classes, courts should accept that caste is covered by Title VII.
In 1989, “Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced the idea that civil
rights laws are ill equipped to address the types of inequality and
discrimination faced by people who suffer multiple, or

79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b)-(d).
80. See Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 578 F.3d 787, 792-93 (8th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1977)).
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‘intersecting,’ axes of discrimination.”81 While courts have
always recognized that Title VII protects individuals from
discrimination based on their existence in one of the protected
classes mentioned in Title VII, courts have begun, albeit slowly
and incompletely,82 to recognize that Title VII also “protects
individuals against discrimination based on the combination or
‘intersection’ of two or more protected classifications.”83
There are multiple reasons why courts have begun to accept
the theory of Intersectionality as a means to bring employment
discrimination claims. For one, courts look to the plain text of
Title VII to find Congress’s intent to accept this theory.84 Most
importantly, the courts see the “or”85 used when listing the
protected classes in Title VII as legislative intent to defend those
who face discrimination due to their existence in multiple
protected classes. Courts also see Congress’s intent to accept
Intersectionality by observing its refusal to adopt an amendment
to Title VII, which would have added the word “solely” to modify
the word “sex.”86 If Congress would have added the word
“solely,” Congress would have demonstrated its intent to limit
Title VII plaintiffs to using their membership in only one

81. Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of
Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 991, 991 (2011).
82. See Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 713, 729 (2015) (describing how since the late 1970s, some decisions have
“contained encouraging language allowing black women to bring combined race/sex
discrimination claims, but employ[] an awkward ‘sex-plus’ analysis” that “allow[s] African
American women to ‘aggregate’ evidence of racial and sexual harassment, but implie[s] that
race and sex discrimination were ‘additive’ rather than inextricably intertwined . . . in
particular . . . abuses directed toward female employees of color”).
83. Brown v. OMO Grp., Inc., No. 9:14-CV-02841, 2017 WL 1148743 at *5 (D.S.C.
2017); see Westmoreland v. Prince George’s Cnty., 876 F. Supp. 2d 594, 604 (D. Md. 2012);
see also Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t. of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 769-771 (E.D. Wis.
2010).
84. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987).
85. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[]”).
86. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416 (“The use of the word ‘or’ evidences Congress’ intent to
prohibit employment discrimination based on any or all of the listed characteristics.”)
(quoting Jeffries v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980));
see Alice Abrokwa, “When They Enter, We All Enter”: Opening the Door to Intersectional
Discrimination Claims Based on Race and Disability, 24 MICH. J. L. & POL. 15, 52 (2018);
see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989), superseded on other
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in
Comcast Co. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
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protected class as the basis for their suit.87 Lastly, courts realize
that refusing to accept this theory would leave those who do not
fit within a single protected class—such as is the case for African
American women—without a viable Title VII remedy.88
“Intersectionality theorists [suggest] two distinct processes
through which people facing multiple disadvantages are
subordinated in the courts . . . .”89 These are “demographic
intersectionality” and “claim intersectionality.”90 Demographic
intersectionality focuses on how judges’, juries’, and lawyers’
discriminatory preconceptions of someone who belongs to
multiple protected classes impact court outcomes.91 However,
because demographic intersectionality focuses on the effects of
discrimination in the courtroom, it is not the focus of this
Comment.92 Instead, claim intersectionality is the focus because
it puts the attention on “discriminatory [processes] that operate in
the labor market.”93
Claim intersectionality occurs “when plaintiffs allege
discrimination on the basis of two or more ascriptive
characteristics” like national origin and sex.94 This theory
“examines how multiple identities overlap to produce distinct
forms of oppression.”95 Claim intersectionality focuses on the
belief that “the law does not adequately redress intersectional
discrimination that occurs in the labor market.”96 Claim
intersectionality is more relevant because this Comment seeks to
recognize that the law indeed can adequately redress
intersectional discrimination that occurs in the labor market. The

87. See Abrokwa, supra note 86, at 52; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.
88. See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032.
89. Best et al., supra note 81, at 993.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 994.
92. See Id.
93. Id.
94. Best et al., supra note 81, at 994.
95. Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic All., No. C10-0862, 2011 WL 13100729
at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 1, 2011); see e.g., Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 641 (7th
Cir. 2000) (finding claims of both racial and sexual harassment were present and supported
by allegations that plaintiff’s supervisor made statements such as “[o]nce you go black, you
never go back” while rubbing against her buttocks).
96. Best et al., supra note 81, at, 993.
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EEOC, “the agency charged with interpreting Title VII,”97 clearly
supports Intersectionality. The EEOC Compliance Manual
states:
Title VII prohibits discrimination not just because of one
protected trait (e.g., race), but also because of the
intersection of two or more protected bases (e.g., race and
sex). For example, Title VII prohibits discrimination against
African American women even if the employer does not
discriminate against White women or African American
men. Likewise, Title VII protects Asian American women
from discrimination based on stereotypes and assumptions
about them “even in the absence of discrimination against
Asian American men or White women.” The law also
prohibits individuals from being subjected to discrimination
because of the intersection of their race and a trait covered
by another EEO statute—e.g., race and disability, or race and
age.98

Although Intersectionality may be a relatively innovative
and complex idea regarding Title VII claims, “it nonetheless has
been admitted in many cases.”99
Despite this support for the viability of Title VII claims that
use Intersectionality, plaintiffs that use this theory still face
multiple hurdles in the judicial system due to skepticism of the
theory. First, some courts refuse to even recognize intersectional
claims as legally cognizable.100 In these cases, the judges
considered race and sex discrimination claims separately, despite
Black female plaintiffs arguing that they experienced unique
discrimination due to their existence in multiple, protected
classifications.101 Second, the complexity of the theory of

97. Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 172 (3rd. Cir. 1991), abrogated on
other grounds St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
98. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC Compliance Manual, Section
15: Race and Color Discrimination, at 8-9, [https://perma.cc/YTS4-H8MT].
99. Apilado, 2011 WL 13100729 at *3; see also Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d
1406, 1416 (concluding that a plaintiff may aggregate evidence of racial hostility with
evidence of sexual hostility in a Title VII action); Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action
Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (“We agree that discrimination against black
females can exist even in the absence of discrimination against black men or white women.”);
see B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t 276 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2002).
100. See Best et al., supra note 81, at 996.
101. See Id.
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Intersectionality also may limit the theory’s utility.102 Plaintiffs
who bring claims based upon Intersectionality face “complex
bias” in court and disproportionate difficulty in winning their
cases.103 Lastly, even in cases where judges allow the use of
Intersectionality as a method to demonstrate discrimination, some
judges limit their considerations to the intersection of two
characteristics at the most “out of concern that [] too many
intersections would turn Title VII into a ‘many-headed Hydra’
and make it impossible to make any employment decisions
‘without incurring a volley of discrimination charges’ . . . .”104
The fact of the matter is that discrimination is often multifaceted due to the multiple characteristics that employees possess.
With this being said, caste, a construct that combines numerous
aspects of life, would be the perfect centerpiece of a Title VII
claim based upon Intersectionality. Therefore, courts must begin
to apply Intersectionality with the understanding that Title VII
was constructed to cover all who face employment
discrimination, including those who face simultaneous
discrimination on multiple fronts.
Dr. Suraj Yengde, a leading scholar on caste discrimination
who was born into a family of “Untouchables,” describes caste as
a storm cloud overhead.105 When a Dalit or lower caste member
sees the cloud of caste overhead, he or she does not expect just
one drop of racism or one drop of colorism. Instead, as any Dalit
or lower caste individual knows, there is going to be a violent
downpour of all types of discrimination.106 While one protected
class under Title VII may be applicable to a certain set of facts in
a discrimination case, caste cannot be jammed into one category
or another. To understand caste discrimination, one must realize
102. Mayeri, supra note 82, at 730.
103. Id.; see also Best et al., supra note 81, at 992, 997 (“[P]laintiffs who make
intersectional claims, alleging that they were discriminated against based on more than one
ascriptive characteristic, are only half as likely to win their cases as are other plaintiffs.”
Plaintiffs lost the defense motion for summary judgment 96 percent of the time in an
empirical study that examined 26 employment discrimination cases in the federal district
courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, a rate higher than plaintiff loss
rates in other studies of summary judgment outcomes.).
104. Best et al., supra note 81, at 997.
105. Telephone Interview with Dr. Suraj Yengde, Assoc., Dep’t of Afr. & Afr. Am.
Stud., Harvard Univ. (Oct. 19, 2020).
106. Id.
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that Dalits and lower caste individuals face discrimination that is
multi-dimensional. Despite the multitude of the aforementioned
hurdles that challenge plaintiffs who aim to utilize
Intersectionality, Intersectionality is the best method to apply to
caste discrimination because it appreciates the complexity of
caste.
IV. WHICH PROTECTED CLASSES PROHIBIT CASTE
DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII?
This Part describes how caste discrimination potentially
intersects into all of the protected classes enumerated in Title
VII.107 It will be clear that some of the classes described have the
capability of prohibiting caste discrimination all by themselves.
Meaning, a court can find that caste discrimination is prohibited
under Title VII because caste discrimination is discrimination
based on just race or national origin. However, this Comment
discusses not how each protected class can single-handedly
prohibit caste discrimination, but how the courts should recognize
that caste discrimination is a multi-dimensional problem that
simultaneously overlaps among a number of protected classes.
A. Race
Race is a “social construction” rather than a biological
category.108 Looking to India, the Indian government, Dalits, and
progressive academics seem to be in agreement that caste is not
race.109 Dalit scholars actually classify the caste system as “worse
than racism” partly because it is “[i]nflicted by birth, sanctified

107. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
108. SOCIOLOGY: UNDERSTANDING AND CHANGING THE SOCIAL WORLD 331-33
(2010) (stating that among the reasons to question the biological concept of race are the facts
that “people from different races are more than 99.9% the same in their DNA” and that “an
individual or a group of individuals is assigned to a race on arbitrary or even illogical
grounds.”).
109. Ambrose Pinto, UN Conference Against Racism: Is Caste Race?, ECON. & POL.
WKLY., 2817-18 (2001) (“The position of GONGO’s (a term that is used for government of
India’s bureaucrats and officials) [is] that caste is social and race is biological . . . .”); Id.
(“Dalits in India, the Ambedkarites, and the progressive academics have never equated race
with caste.”).
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by religion, [and] glorified by tradition.”110 Ultimately, while
these views may be important in shaping future EEOC guidance
regarding Title VII’s coverage of caste discrimination, we must
look to what the EEOC, the courts, and other legislation currently
say about race to determine whether courts may accept caste
discrimination as discrimination based upon race.
Currently, “Title VII does not contain a definition of
‘race.’”111 Further, “Title VII cases largely have been silent as to
what ‘race’ means under the statute.”112 With Title VII’s silence
in mind, one might also look to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to find
definitions of racial discrimination because “[t]he basic contours
of what constitutes racial discrimination under § 1981 also apply
in Title VII cases, and vice versa.”113 Section 1981(a) gives “[a]ll
persons,” regardless of race, the same right to “make and enforce
contracts,” and pertinent to this piece, employment contracts.114
Most importantly, the Court in St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,
a case where an associate professor claimed racial discrimination
based upon his Arabian ancestry, held that “[u]nder § 1981 the
term ‘race’ includes groups identified by their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics.”115 Thus, the St. Francis College Court showed
that a plaintiff could bring a § 1981 claim, and therefore a Title
VII claim, based on racial discrimination if the plaintiff was
discriminated against based on his or her ethnicity or ancestry.
It is clear that one’s caste can very well be interpreted as
one’s ethnicity because ethnicity refers to one’s “unique set of
cultural characteristics” such as one’s religion, naming, and
110. Id. at 2819.
111. Questions and Answers about Race and Color Discrimination in Employment,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Apr. 9, 2006), [https://perma.cc/9NNP-MST8]
(last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
112. WHAT IS “RACE” DISCRIMINATION, 5 EMP. COORDINATOR EMP. PRACTICES §
3:5.
113. Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 475 n.107.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
115. See supra note 112 (emphasis added); see generally St. Francis College v. AlKhazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (emphasis added) (“Based on the history of § 1981, we
have little trouble in concluding that Congress intended to protect from discrimination
identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because
of their ancestry of ethnic characteristics . . . . The Court of Appeals was thus quite right in
holding that § 1981, ‘at a minimum,’ reaches discrimination against an individual ‘because
he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping
of homo sapiens.’”).
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public life.116 It may even be the case that caste fits perfectly
within the class of race due to the characteristics listed as making
up one’s ethnicity, and therefore one’s race. As this Comment
discussed in Part I, it is true that one’s caste is a conglomeration
of such cultural characteristics such as naming,117 religion,118 and
public life.119 However, though a plaintiff can possibly base his
or her entire claim on the premise that caste discrimination is race
discrimination, this Comment shows how a plaintiff can use the
theory of Intersectionality to more completely demonstrate how
caste encompasses discrimination based at least in part upon all
of Title VII’s protected classes.
Though the vast number of cases are silent as to what “race”
means under Title VII, the Second and Third Circuits have issued
similar holdings that align with St. Francis College. In Bennun v.
Rutgers State University, the court held that Title VII protects
individuals who are ethnically Hispanic—“of or derived from
Spain or the Spanish.”120 Further, the Bennun Court ruled that
discrimination based on someone’s “ancestry or lack thereof
constitutes racial discrimination” under Title VII.121 Similarly, in
Barrella, the Second Circuit also held that “race” under Title VII
encompasses ethnicity just as § 1981 does.122
Lastly, and most importantly for courts following the Second
and Third Circuits, the EEOC also supports this idea that
discrimination based upon one’s ancestry is racial discrimination.
The EEOC explains that “[r]ace discrimination includes
discrimination on the basis of ancestry or physical or cultural

116. Hervé Varenne, The Study of Ethnicity, Minority Groups and Identity,
BRITANNICA, [https://perma.cc/TN29-6MBD] (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).
117. Jeya Rani, So the Term ‘Dalit’ Can’t Be Used But ‘Brahmin’ and 6,000 Other
Caste Names Can, WIRE (Sept. 14, 2018), [https://perma.cc/9JJC-J454] (describing how it
is common that one’s caste can be identified through their surname).
118. Why This India Priest Carried an ‘Untouchable’ into a Temple, BBC NEWS (Apr.
20, 2018), [https://perma.cc/DDB4-2GZH].
119. Sell, supra note 23 (“Dalits usually have little other option in urban areas than to
cram into the already crowded slums, where their access to clean, safe water and sanitation
is often severely limited. Many still get their water from dirty shallow wells, or illegally
from leaks in the city’s piped water supply.”).
120. See supra note 112; see also Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 180
(3d Cir. 1991).
121. See supra note 112.
122. Vill. of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 607 (2d Cir. 2016).
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characteristics associated with a certain race, such as skin color,
hair texture or styles, or certain facial features.”123 The aspects of
ancestry in the EEOC’s definition, as well as the rulings in the
Second and Third Circuits, strengthen this Comment’s contention
that caste, a system centered upon ancestry and encompassing
characteristics common to one’s ethnicity, intersects with the
protected class of race.
B. Color
Discrimination based on color is not defined in Title VII.
However, the EEOC describes “Color [D]iscrimination” as
involving treating someone unfavorably because of “his/her skin
pigmentation (lightness or darkness of the skin), complexion,
shade, or tone.”124 Therefore, in order for caste discrimination to
be discrimination based on color in the eyes of the EEOC, caste
discrimination must involve treating someone unfavorably due to
their complexion. Importantly, in the caste discrimination
context, “[c]olor discrimination can occur . . . between persons of
the same race or ethnicity.”125 When inquiring whether caste
discrimination is based on color and/or race, one analyzes similar
facts because race is based on physical features and skin color is
a physical feature.
While Indian scholars and commentators discount the idea
that skin color is inherent to Hinduism,126 there seems to be an
understanding among Indians that skin color, caste, and religion
are clearly “closely related” and that “whatever is black is not
welcome in the Indian society.”127 One innovative and frequently
cited study has even gone as far as to support this relation through
science, finding that the “social structure defined by the caste
123. See supra note 111.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Neha Mishra, Indian and Colorism: The Finer Nuances, 14 WASH. U. GLOB.
STUDS. L. REV. 725, 726 n.6 (2015) (“[U]nderstanding Varna in the context of color is
misleading.”); see also Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 477 (“[C]aste
discrimination is not best understood as discrimination on the basis of ‘color.’”).
127. David Love, Blackness Around the Globe: Dark-Skinned Dalits Fight an
Oppressive Caste System in India—‘Whatever is Black is Not Welcomed’, ATLANTA BLACK
STAR (May 2, 2016), [https://perma.cc/XSR2-KVTY].
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system has a ‘profound influence on skin pigmentation.’”128 As
one Indian observer notes “[a]ll the images of the popular gods
and goddesses that we see around us, photographs in our home
shrines or prayer halls . . . all show them to be light-skinned.”129
These light-skinned portrayals are sometimes even in direct
contrast to how the gods and goddesses are illustrated in Hindu
scripture.130
Most significantly, in terms of finding that caste
discrimination can be based on one’s complexion, lower caste
applicants report that their skin color is an immediate way to
reveal their lower caste status, which in turn, severely limits their
ability to be hired.131 Ultimately, though the link between caste
and skin color may not be religiously codified, the connection has
subsequently been cemented into Hindu culture—a culture that
has now immigrated into the American workplace. With this
evidence of caste-based colorism existing both in India and in the
United States, the courts should acknowledge that caste
discrimination is prohibited by Title VII because caste
discrimination can, at least in part, be based upon one’s
complexion. Further, the fact that skin color is a feature of caste
discrimination, strengthens the argument that caste is best
understood as an intersectional issue because caste discrimination
overlaps into the protected class of color.

128. Luke Koshi, Does Caste Influence Colour in India? Genetics Study Finds a
Profound Link, NEWS MINUTE (Nov. 23, 2016), [https://perma.cc/D7UY-VLFK].
129. Dark is Divine: What Colour are Indian Gods and Goddesses?, BBC NEWS (Jan.
21, 2018), [https://perma.cc/84YN-BHMJ].
130. See Id. (“[E]ven Krishna, who is described as a dark-skinned god in the scriptures,
is often shown as fair. And so is the elephant-headed Ganesha, even though there are no
white elephants in India.”).
131. Tiku, supra note 14 (“In more than 100 job interviews for contract work over the
past 20 years, Kaila said he only got one job offer when another Indian interviewed him in
person . . . . ‘They don’t bring up caste, but they can easily identify us,’ Kaila says, rattling
off all of the ways he can be outed as potentially being Dalit, including the fact that he has
darker skin.”).
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C. Religion
The EEOC Compliance Manual clearly recognizes that
Hinduism is a religion under Title VII.132 Further, “Title VII
defines ‘religion’ to include ‘all aspects of religious observance
and practice as well as belief.’”133 As discussed in Part I, despite
many scholars arguing that the caste system is relatively new to
the practice of Hinduism, there is no doubt that since the British
arrived, caste has become inextricably intertwined with
Hinduism.134 Currently, it is true that caste cannot exist without
Hinduism and vice versa. Importantly, there are no cases where
the plaintiff has used the theory of Intersectionality to
demonstrate that he/she is being discriminated against based upon
his or her existence in both the protected class of religion as well
as another protected class. Therefore, this Section is only an
expression of the concept of Intersectionality and how a victim of
caste discrimination can still use this theory in bringing a Title
VII claim.
We can see this interconnectedness by looking at the history
of Hinduism’s growth in the Indian sub-continent. In fact, the
dominant brahmanical religion that we now know as modern
Hinduism, absorbed many primeval tribal groups—such as the
Dalits—over centuries of development, along with their gods,
goddesses, religious rituals and customs.135 Brahmin priests
absorbed tribal traditions and institutionalized them with myths
and forms of cult practices to their own advantage. This process
of “Hindu imperialism” went hand in hand with subjugating tribal
groups politically and economically so as to justify the Dalits’
exclusion.136
As previously discussed in Part I, the caste system is a
system of religious purity that is handed down from generation to

132. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2021, SECTION 12:
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION (2021), [https://perma.cc/9LTW-S4QF].
133. Id.
134. See supra Section I.B.
135. A.M. Abraham Ayrookuzhiel, The Dalits, Religions and Interfaith Dialogue, 7 J.
HINDU-CHRISTIAN STUDS. 2 (1994) (“the tribal god or Orissa became identified with
Vishnu”).
136. Id.
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generation.137 Important to this point, “discrimination on the
basis of religion can be on the basis of religious heritage.”138 In
Gulitz v. DiBartolo, the court recognized that because the
plaintiff’s coworkers discriminated against him based on his
Jewish heritage—an assertion supported due to his father’s
practicing of Judaism—Title VII protected the plaintiff because
he fell into the protected class of religion.139 Essentially, the fact
that plaintiff was “being discriminated against on account of the
religion of his forbears” qualified him for Title VII protection.140
Such reasoning would translate well to a potential caste
discrimination case brought by a Dalit or lower caste plaintiff
because “to discriminate against someone based on caste is [] to
discriminate against them on the basis that they had an ancestor
who occupied a certain position in Hindu society.”141 Following
the Gulitz reasoning, this type of discrimination would certainly
be religious discrimination prohibited by Title VII and fits the
mold of the Intersectionality theory despite Gulitz itself not being
a case based upon Intersectionality.
Though Hinduism has led Dalits to embrace other religions
in search of human dignity, such as Islam, Sikhism, Christianity,
and Buddhism,142 one’s Dalit status does not leave them. Indeed,
for those that suffer the most from the caste system, the Dalits,
conversion “is an action that does not bear any change in [Dalits’]
material lives.”143 For example, despite Christianity professing
itself as an egalitarian religion, Dalit Christians are not even
allowed to sit in pews meant for higher-caste Christians.144
Indeed, Dalit Christians are “‘twice discriminated against’—in
society and within the church.”145 Further, Dalit Muslims are not
allowed to marry high-caste Muslims and “Buddhist monasteries
137. See Nadkarni, supra note 19, at 4783.
138. Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 477.
139. No. 08-CV-2388, 2010 WL 11712777, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010).
140. Id.
141. Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 478.
142. See Ayrookuzhiel, supra note 135, at 3.
143. Rahul Sonpimple, Dait Conversions: An Act of Rebellion Against Caste
Supremacy, ALJAZEERA (June 14, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4HCU-CXUG].
144. Vatsala Vedantum, Still Untouchable: The Politics of Religious Conversion,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY (June 19, 2002), [https://perma.cc/4F4J-YHJH].
145. Id.
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have not been able to prevent their converts from their earlier
casteist practices.”146 At the end of the day, even if Dalits convert,
they are still subject to discrimination based upon Hindu tradition.
Therefore, such discrimination would still be religious
discrimination and would therefore fall under Title VII.
D. Sex
While it is difficult, if not plainly inaccurate, to “simply
reduc[e]”147 caste discrimination to sex discrimination, it would
be even more inaccurate to reject the fact that “[c]aste
discrimination has a unique and specific impact on Dalit women
who endure multiple forms of discrimination.”148 By recognizing
that Dalit and lower caste women suffer from a unique type of
caste discrimination that is based not only upon their caste status,
but also upon their sex, one can easily see why the theory of
Intersectionality best encompasses caste discrimination.
Importantly, to understand how caste discrimination based at least
in part on sex even exists in United States employment, one must
look to caste discrimination based on sex in India. By looking to
the effects of caste discrimination against women in India, one
can better understand why an upper-caste supervisor in the United
States may attempt to uphold such entrenched practices by
discriminating against Dalit and lower caste women even in the
United States employment context.
Dalit women in particular face a “‘triple burden’ of gender
bias, caste discrimination and economic deprivation.”149 In India,
caste discrimination against Dalit women rises to the level of
outright violence. Dalit women “continue to be stalked, abused,
molested, raped and murdered with impunity.”150 In India, ten
146. Id.
147. Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 471.
148. Narula, supra note 54, at 277. Although this Section will focus on caste
discrimination perpetuated against lower caste women on the basis of sex due to the
overwhelming evidence that shows that lower caste, and especially Dalit, women suffer from
the worst treatment, it is important to realize that simultaneous caste and sex-based
discrimination in United States employment could exist against both men and women as well
as against those who are members of the upper castes.
149. Soutik Biswas, Hathras Case: Dalit Women are Among the Most Oppressed in
the World, BBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/S6EB-WBYK].
150. Id.
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Dalit women were raped every day in 2019.151 Though records
do not reflect that such sexual violence is perpetuated against
Dalit women in the United States, sexual violence against Dalit
women is not completely foreign to the United States.152
For employment, Dalit women in India “are allotted some of
the most menial and arduous tasks and experience greater
discrimination in payment of wages than Dalit men.”153
Therefore, one can imagine how it is even more offensive to an
upper caste supervisor as well as the caste hierarchy to see that
Dalit women, considered the lowest of the low in India, are
achieving economic and social mobility through employment in
the United States. While Dalit women in the United States have
much more opportunity than Dalit women in India, who are often
landless laborers or forced into prostitution,154 Dalit women do
not shed their caste once they are in the United States.
Such an inability to escape caste in the United States as a
Dalit or lower caste woman can be seen by looking at the story of
Maya Kamble. Kamble was one of the first women to enter the
technical industry in Los Angeles, California.155 Kamble
identifies as a Buddhist Ambedkarite but nonetheless is
considered as a Dalit to her upper caste supervisors due to the fact
that Buddhist Ambedkarites descend from Dalit converts.156
Kamble’s supervisor, knowing that she came from Dalit origins,
continuously subjected her to bias in the workplace.157 This
supervisor “continually ice[d] her out of conversations” and even
told her not to touch a tool because she was “ill-fated”—a jeer
used towards Dalits, and especially Dalit women, due to the belief
that a Dalit’s impurity generates misfortune.158
151. Id.
152. See e.g., Ray, supra note 10 (discussing the story of Preeti Meshram, a Dalit
woman who was raped by an upper caste classmate while going to New England college for
her doctorate).
153. Narula, supra note 54, at 277-78.
154. Id. at 278-83.
155. Thenmozhi Soundararajan, Caste in the USA, Episode 4: Battling Caste Bias as
a Woman in Tech, and Thriving Under Non-Indian Bosses, FIRSTPOST (Nov. 11, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/Q2LL-VU26].
156. Gail Omvedt, BUDDHISM IN INDIA: CHALLENGING BRAHMANISM AND CASTE
264 (2003).
157. Soundararajan, supra note 155.
158. Id.
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Importantly, Kamble is not the only Dalit woman in the
United States tech industry who faces “the casteist networks of
Silicon Valley Tech.”159 In October 2020, thirty Dalit female
engineers in Silicon Valley came forward with a statement
speaking out on caste bias in their workplaces, which included
tech giants like Apple, Microsoft, and Google.160 These female
engineers described that “working with Indian managers is a
living hell,” stating that “[t]heir gender and caste politics leave a
lot to be desired.”161 Specifically, these engineers said that
“[d]ominant caste men make jokes about Dalit reservation, as
well as inappropriate jokes about Dalit and Muslim women.”162
These women even told of instances where this hostility in the
workplace escalated to sexual harassment.163
Overall, from these personal accounts in the United States,
it is clear that although Dalit and lower caste men are also
subjected to similar treatment, Dalit and lower caste women face
unique discrimination. By observing the limitations and violence
Dalit women face in India and how this discrimination has
translated to the American workplace, one can see that Dalit and
lower caste women are at the intersection of both caste and sexbased discrimination. With this understanding, the theory of
Intersectionality is the best way to address caste discrimination,
especially for female employees.
E. National Origin
Similar to the analysis in Section D, it would be inaccurate
to reduce caste discrimination as discrimination based solely on
one’s South Asian identity.164
However, although caste
discrimination may not be distilled solely to national origin
discrimination, this Comment proposes that caste discrimination
can, at least in part, overlap into the protected class of national
159. A Statement on Caste Bias in Silicon Valley from 30 Dalit Women Engineers,
WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/KW5Q-Q3XK].
160. Tiku, supra note 14.
161. A Statement on Caste Bias in Silicon Valley from 30 Dalit Women Engineers,
supra note 159 (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 472.
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origin based on the EEOC’s, and the common law’s, definition of
national origin discrimination. While one’s membership in some
of the protected classes may be easy to identify, such as one’s
race, color, or sex, one’s national origin may be more difficult to
identify. Courts across the country recognize that unlawful
discrimination must be based on the employee’s objective
appearance to others, not his own subjective feelings about
himself.165 Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the alleged
discriminator was actually correct in assuming an employee’s
place of origin.166
The EEOC defines “national origin discrimination broadly,
as including, but not limited to, the denial of equal employment
opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s,
place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural
or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.”167 This
broad interpretation of national origin finds support in the judicial
system which deems national origin as “better understood by
reference to certain traits or characteristics that can be linked to
one’s place of origin, as opposed to a specific country or
nation.”168 The first clause of the EEOC’s definition of national
origin focuses on discrimination based on an individual’s or their
ancestors’ place of origin. Importantly, like the EEOC’s
definition of national origin, its definition of “place of origin” is
also broad. One’s place of origin can even include large
geographic regions such as South Asia.169 Also, as mentioned
165. Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991); see also
Mobijohn v. Ellenville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 92-CV-0672, 1995 WL 574461, at *1 n.2
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1995); Almendares v. Palmer, No. 00-CV-7524, 2002 WL 31730963,
at *10 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2002); Huffman v. City of Conroe, No. H-07-1964, 2009 WL
361413, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009).
166. See Almendares, 2002 WL 31730963, at *10; Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg. 85633 (Dec. 29, 1980) (“In order to have a claim
of national origin under Title VII, it is not necessary to show that the alleged discriminator
knew the particular national origin group to which the complainant belonged.”).
167. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2022).
168. McNaught v. Va. Cmty. Coll. Sys., 933 F. Supp. 2d 804, 817 (E.D. Va. 2013)
(quoting Kanaji v. Child.’s Hosp. of Phila., 276 F. Supp. 2d 399, 401-02 (E.D. Pa. 2003));
but see Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973) (explaining that national origin
discrimination under Title VII is discrimination based on “where a person was born, or, more
broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came”).
169. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2016-2, EEOC
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION.
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above, a discriminator does not need to pinpoint the employee’s
exact country of origin in order to discriminate on the basis of the
plaintiff’s place of origin. Therefore, even if a person suffering
from national origin discrimination is from the United States
instead of South Asia, the victim can still bring a Title VII claim
based on national origin discrimination.
While it is nearly impossible to distinguish certain South
Asian regions as being majority Dalit or majority Brahmin due to
the presence of all castes throughout South Asia,170 those
discriminating on the basis of caste likely have knowledge that
nearly half of India’s Dalit population resides in four Indian
states.171 Therefore, though caste can more accurately be
described as a “qualification” of one’s South Asian identity, it is
possible that a potential discriminator can learn or presume that
someone is from one of these four Indian states and discriminate
on that basis.172
Even with this in mind, a stronger argument exists in the
second clause of the EEOC’s definition as well as in definitions
of national origin existing in common law.173 These definitions
focus on discrimination based on certain objectively identifiable
“physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin
group,” such as South Asians.174 As discussed in Sections I.A-B,
caste has existed for centuries in South Asia, structuring
individual identities as well as intercommunity relationships that
continue to exist today.175 Therefore, caste discrimination is
inherently dictated by South Asian culture and practice.
The cultural characteristic of one’s surname is one
objectively identifiable example of how caste is inextricably
170. Priyali Sur, Under India’s Caste System, Dalits are Considered Untouchable. The
Coronavirus is Intensifying that Slur, CNN (Apr. 17, 2020, 3:04 AM), [https://perma.cc
/9TUQ-6FND] (quoting activist Paul Divakar from the National Campaign on Dalit Human
Rights, “India has 600,000 villages and almost every village a small pocket of outskirts is
meant for Dalits”).
171. B. Sivakumar, Half of India’s Dalit Population Lives in 4 States, TNN (May 2,
2013, 6:16 AM IST), [https://perma.cc/HQ3G-VGL9].
172. See Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 472.
173. See McNaught v. Va. Cmty. Coll. Sys., 933 F. Supp. 2d 804, 817 (E.D. Va. 2013)
(quoting Kanaji v. Child.’s Hosp. of Phila., 276 F. Supp. 2d 399, 401-02 (E.D. Pa. 2003)).
174. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2022).
175. Madhusudan Subedi, Caste in South Asia: From Ritual Hierarchy to Politics of
Difference, POLITEJA, 320 (2016).
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intertwined with South Asia. Carrying caste surnames is the most
humiliating aspect of a Dalit’s daily life.176 Similar to how
Americans may have profession-based surnames, such as Miller
or Baker, Dalit surnames tell their own story. A Dalit’s surname
tells a story of contempt that travels back to the days of their
ancestors. On the contrary, the Brahmins flaunt their caste names
as surnames with much pride.177 Despite there being over a
billion people in India with different languages, cultures, and food
customs, a surname that reflects one’s Brahmin-status can quickly
establish a common ground between upper caste individuals.178
The power or oppression that flows from caste surnames is
not unrecognized in India. Caste surnames were even abolished
altogether in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu in 1929—the only
state to have ever done so.179 The caste surname has become an
“oral caste certificate” that can transcend borders and lead to
caste-discrimination in the United States.180 All an upper caste
supervisor or employer in the United States has to do in order to
find out an employee’s caste is to say, “Hello, my name is (upper
caste surname). What is yours?”
Assuming the upper caste supervisor begins to subject the
plaintiff to less pay and/or caste-based insults after learning the
plaintiff’s surname, the plaintiff may begin to mull the possibility
of bringing a Title VII claim based on national origin
discrimination. To prove his claim, the employee needs to use the
disparate treatment illustrated in Part V to demonstrate how his
surname is an objectively identifiable cultural characteristic that
falls within the protected class of national origin. To do so, the
employee would need to show that his surname would
immediately put an upper caste supervisor on notice of his Dalit
status. Then, the employee will need to tie all of the information
together for the court. At the very least, the employee needs to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that “national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,”

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Rani, supra note 117.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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even if other legitimate factors also motivated the action.181
Overall, the deep ties between caste and the national origin group
of South Asians demonstrate how caste discrimination overlaps
into the protected class of national origin, thus enforcing this
Comment’s proposal that the theory of Intersectionality is the best
way for courts to understand and prohibit caste discrimination
under Title VII.

V. HOW IS A TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
BROUGHT?

Now that this Comment has demonstrated how caste
discrimination can be covered by Title VII, this Part describes
how a plaintiff would actually bring a Title VII claim based on
caste discrimination. Further, and importantly, this Part identifies
the standards of causation to be met regarding each approach.
There are “four separate legal theories under which a
plaintiff can bring a Title VII caste discrimination [claim].”182
The first approach is disparate treatment, which “refers to the
unlawful practice of treating an employee differently based on his
or her membership in a protected class.”183 Disparate treatment184
is proven by “direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or by
proving a [discriminatory] pattern [] on the part of the
employer.”185 The second approach is by disparate impact, which
refers to a practice that, “while not facially discriminatory, has a
disparate impact on a particular protected class.”186 While it is
possible to bring a caste discrimination-based Title VII claim
181. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m)).
182. Donald F. Kiesling Jr., Title VII and the Temporary Employment Relationship, 32
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997).
183. Id.
184. This is the most common type of claim. Id.
185. Id.; Gilbert v. MetLife, Inc., No. 09-1990, 2011 WL 183441 at *7 (D. Minn. 2011)
(quoting Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004)) (“‘direct’ refers
to the causal strength of proof . . . . A plaintiff with strong (direct) evidence that illegal
discrimination motivated the employer’s adverse action does not need the three-part
McDonnell Douglas analysis to get to the jury, regardless of whether his strong evidence is
circumstantial.”); see also Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 2001) (direct
evidence “shows that the employer’s discrimination was purposeful, intentional or overt”).
186. Kiesling Jr., supra note 182, at 4.

5 WHITLEY.MAN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

4/13/22 10:01 AM

IMPORTING INDIAN INTOLERANCE

197

under the disparate impact theory, this Comment does not discuss
this approach at length due to an employee’s likely inability to
produce the requisite statistical evidence demonstrating
disparities in the “percentage of [lower caste] workers in the
employer’s work force with the percentage of qualified members
. . . in the relevant labor market.”187 Such statistics would be
difficult to produce because there are a lack of concrete numbers
of Dalit and lower caste individuals in the workforce—a difficulty
that is at least partially explained by the fact that Dalits and lower
caste individuals are usually hesitant to expose their caste
status.188
The third approach is retaliation.189 This approach protects
employees who participate in filing a discrimination charge
against an employer but then, in retaliation to this filing, suffer an
adverse employment action.190 The fourth potential approach is
harassment in a hostile work environment.191 This theory requires
that the plaintiff present evidence that his/her workplace is
permeated with “discriminatory intimidation . . . and insult” that
is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.”192 Similar to the disparate impact approach, this
Comment does not concede the impossibility of a biased
supervisor creating a hostile work environment because of one’s
caste, yet this Comment also does not discuss this approach at
length. This decision to not discuss harassment is based on the
fact that if courts agree that caste is covered by Title VII under
the disparate treatment theory, courts would likely also recognize
a caste-based Title VII claim under the harassment theory, where
the effects of the discrimination need to be even more evident, as
legally cognizable.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

MacRae v. McCormick, 458 F. Supp. 970, 979-80 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
ZWICK-MAITREYI, ET AL., supra note 9.
Kiesling Jr., supra note 182, at 5.
Id.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1993).
Id. at 21 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)).
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A. Disparate Treatment
If there is circumstantial or direct evidence that an individual
is being discriminated against on the basis of their caste, then the
employee may bring an unlawful discrimination suit based on
disparate treatment.193 “The cornerstone of a disparate-treatment
case is that the employee must show that discrimination was
intentional, unlike in disparate impact cases where there is only
discriminatory effect.”194 “A person suffers disparate treatment
in his employment ‘when he or she is singled out and treated less
favorably than others similarly situated’” because of a protected
characteristic.195 There are two alternative methods under which
disparate treatment can be proven.
1. Pretext or Single-Motive Analysis
In cases involving a plaintiff who attempts to prove the
employer’s defense to discrimination is pretextual, courts “use the
[] burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green”—the premier case in proving discrimination in
employment.196
A pretext analysis is an “all-or-nothing
instruction.”197
It asks the factfinder to find the one
discriminatory motive for the employment action. Under this
analysis, the complainant must first establish, by a preponderance
of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination.198 This may
be done by demonstrating that (1) the employee belongs to a
protected class; (2) the plaintiff “applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants;” (3) “despite
[plaintiff’s qualifications], he was rejected;” and (4) “after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
193. Maya R. Warrier, Dare To Step Out of the Fogg: Single-Motive Versus MixedMotive Analysis in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases, 47 LOUISVILLE L. REV.,
409, 417 n.54 (2008).
194. Id. at 409.
195. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006)
(quoting McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004)).
196. Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 60 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
197. William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 213 (2003).
198. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.

5 WHITLEY.MAN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

IMPORTING INDIAN INTOLERANCE

4/13/22 10:01 AM

199

to seek applicants from persons of [plaintiff’s] qualifications.”199
Next, the employer “must clearly set forth, through introduction
of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, if believed
by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful
discrimination was not the cause of the challenged employment
action.”200 It is likely that most cases that originate from caste
discrimination will at least survive summary judgment because
“the degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case [of
discrimination] is ‘minimal and does not even need to rise to the
level of a preponderance of the evidence.’”201
If a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the
employer to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee’s rejection.”202 If the employer shows a
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions, the
employee needs only to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the employer’s asserted reasons for its actions are
a mere “pretext” for its true discriminatory motives.203
However, the McDonell Douglas framework is not the only
means of establishing a prima facie case of individual
discrimination. As the facts inevitably vary in Title VII cases, the
“prima facie proof required from [a plaintiff] is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.”204
Overall, as long as the plaintiff in some way carries the “initial
burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that
an employment decision is based on a discriminatory criterion
illegal under the Act,” the McDonnell Douglas method will be set
into motion allowing a victim to possibly recover.205

199. Id.
200. Wooster, supra note 74.
201. Story v. Napolitano, 771 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1248 (E.D. Wash. 2011) (quoting
Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)).
202. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
203. Id. at 802-05; see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 143
(2000).
204. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13; see, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976) (holding that it is unnecessary to make each individual of a
class action show personal monetary loss and that petitioners have carried their burden by
only demonstrating the existence of a discriminatory hiring pattern and practice by the
respondents).
205. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).
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2. Mixed-Motive Analysis
What the McDonnell Douglas framework failed to address
is the fact that employment decisions are usually made for
multiple reasons. Mixed motives are “usually prevalent in
employment decision-making because (1) biased decisionmaking based on social-category information can occur without
the decision maker’s awareness and (2) people are experts in
masking behavior that is often questionable or negatively viewed
by society.”206 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins first addressed the
issue of what happens when an employer has more than motive
when making an employment decision.207 However, Price
Waterhouse only brought more confusion. Lower courts were
split in deciding whether to follow Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence which stated that the employer’s discriminatory
motive must be a “substantial factor” or the plurality’s opinion
which stated that the employer’s discriminatory motive must be a
“motivating factor.”208
In response to the confusion caused by Price Waterhouse
and other Supreme Court decisions that limited the rights of
employees who sued their employers for discrimination,
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“1991 Act”)—an
amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.209 In particular, §
107 of the 1991 Act set standards applicable to mixed motive
cases—as demonstrated in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.210 The
first provision establishes an alternative for proving that an
unlawful employment practice has occurred.211 This provision
states that “an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates [by a preponderance of the
evidence] that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice,” even if other
legitimate factors also motivated the action.212 The second
206. Warrier, supra note 193, at 424.
207. See generally 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
208. Warrier, supra note 193, at 414.
209. S. 1745 (102nd): Civil Rights Act of 1991, GOVTRACK, [https://perma.cc/3RG63H5U] (last visited March 17th, 2021).
210. 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003).
211. Id. at 101.
212. Id. at 94, 99 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
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provision provides a limited affirmative defense that does not
absolve the employer of liability but instead only restricts the
remedies available to a potential plaintiff.213
Most importantly, after Desert Palace, direct evidence is not
necessary in order to submit a mixed-motive instruction to the
jury in a Title VII discrimination case.214 This is significant
because plaintiffs were previously forced to use the pretext
method when no direct evidence existed. Now that this barrier
has been lifted, employees have much more freedom to choose
the mixed-motive method, which is not burdened by the higher
standard of causation within the pretext analysis.215
The Desert Palace Court at least impliedly indicated the
irrelevance, or even impossibility, of continuing to apply
McDonnell Douglas under Title VII after the Ninth Circuit stated
that “‘an unlawful employment practice’ encompasses any
situation in which a protected characteristic was ‘a motivating
factor’ in an employment action, even if there were other
motives.”216 Essentially, as soon as the defendant illustrates a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the case becomes a mixedmotive case because there now possibly exists both
discriminatory and non-discriminatory motives.217 Despite the
Desert Palace holding, courts continue to use the McDonnell
Douglas standard in employment discrimination cases.218
To put the significance of the Desert Palace decision in
perspective for this piece, consider how an employee can now use
a mixed-motive method without producing direct evidence. For
example, a potential upper caste, discriminatory supervisor will
likely attempt to cover up the discriminatory motive behind their
employment decision regarding the Dalit employee. As is true
with numerous employers, the supervisor will likely attempt to
rationalize the adverse employment action by reasoning that they
took action for reasons that sound justifiable but, are in reality,
213. Id. at 94.
214. Id. at 98-99.
215. Corbett, supra note 197, at 212.
216. Warrier, supra note 193, at 421 (emphasis added) (quoting Costa v. Desert Palace,
Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 848 (9th Cir. 2002)).
217. Corbett, supra note 197, at 213.
218. Warrier, supra note 193, at 422.
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merely a cover-up for discrimination. The discriminatory
supervisor can explain that the Dalit employee did not get the
promotion because of non-descript reasons like he “did not have
enough experience managing others” or that the Dalit employee
was terminated for having a “lack of deference to others.”
Circumstantial evidence can expose the employer’s ill intentions
by allowing the plaintiff to show that the employer uses shifting
rationales or discriminatory remarks, giving a juror a “window
into [the employer’s] state of mind.”219 The employee can also
show workforce composition, which can demonstrate that the
upper ranks of a company are closed off to Dalit employees.220
Overall, the flexibility and less stringent causation analysis of the
mixed-motive method gives employees another weapon to
combat employment discrimination.
For instance, upper caste supervisors may develop a practice
of not promoting those who are beneficiaries of India’s system of
affirmative action—a system that commonly benefits Dalits. An
upper caste employer can easily discover that the Dalit employee
is a beneficiary by simply looking up the employee’s graduating
class to see whether the employee has “ST,” which means,
“Scheduled Tribe,” next to his name.221 “Scheduled Tribe” is a
common label for lower caste members.222 A potential employee
can point to how the supervisor promotes only those who are not
beneficiaries of India’s affirmative action system and that when
the supervisor does promote beneficiaries, he only does so when
the beneficiary does not have “ST” next to his name.
VI. WHAT ARE SOME ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS IN
PREVENTING CASTE DISCRIMINATION?
In America, “caste” is not a household word. Even if an
American has heard of the caste system, it is rare that this person
also fully appreciates caste’s complexity as well as the inequality
219. David I. Brody, “But I Can’t Prove It.” Yes You Can, with Circumstantial
Evidence, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 11, 2019), [https://perma.cc/2Y9J-Q72L].
220. Id.
221. See SAMUEL L. MYERS, JR. & VANISHREE RADHAKRISHNA, HATE CRIMES,
CRIMES OF ATROCITY, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES 22
(2017).
222. Id.
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that flows from the caste system. This lack of understanding is
reflected in the American legal system where “there are very little
[constitutional and statutory] protections for Dalits in the United
States for the discrimination that they encounter here with caste
Hindus.”223
With this in mind, many are skeptical as to whether there
exists federal law “to insulate Dalits and low caste Indians from
caste bias.”224 In this Part, this Comment proposes that, in order
to circumvent a potentially hesitant judicial system, those who see
caste discrimination as a persistent problem in employment in the
United States need to avoid molding caste into something that
satisfies how courts—which are largely unfamiliar with caste—
classify Title VII discrimination. Instead, advocates for the end
of caste discrimination need to take the issue head on. In other
words, advocates—whether they are EEOC employees, members
of Congress, or administrators at universities—need to push for
caste-centric
policy
that
explicitly
prohibits
caste
discrimination.225 For example, the EEOC can issue new
guidance to the courts and employers stating that caste
discrimination is intersectional discrimination prohibited by Title
VII. Although the courts would have to agree with this guidance,
the fact that the leading agency on Title VII, as well as other
advocates for the end of caste discrimination, have spoken up
about the issue should put the courts on notice.
Another example of advocates taking charge on this issue
comes from Brandeis University.
Brandeis’s former
nondiscrimination policy only prohibited “forms of
discrimination that are overtly described in federal and state
law.”226 However, Brandeis realized that in order to follow its
principles of equitable access and inclusion, it would have to take
steps that even federal and state laws have yet to approach.
Similar to this Comment’s intersectional proposal, Brandeis
223. Phillip Martin, Caste Bias Isn’t Illegal in the United States. But This University
is Trying to Fight It, GBH NEWS (Feb. 27, 2019), [https://perma.cc/8B72-AB8S].
224. Id.
225. See Telephone Interview with Dr. Suraj Yengde, Assoc., Dep’t of Afr. & Afr.
Am. Stud., Harvard Univ. (Oct. 19, 2020).
226. BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY, Statement on the Interpretation of Caste Within the
Brandeis Nondiscrimination Policy, BRANDEIS UNIV. (Nov. 26, 2019), [https://perma.cc
/8XGE-JQRL].
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“believes that caste identity is so inextricably intertwined with
[race, color, ancestry, religious creed, and national or ethnic
origin] that discrimination based on one’s caste is effectively
discrimination based on an amalgamation of legally protected
characteristics.”227 For these reasons, Brandeis took charge and
prohibited discrimination and harassment based on caste.228
Congress can even pass legislation that explicitly prohibits
caste discrimination under Title VII. Although it may seem that
prohibiting such intolerance should be uncontroversial, one must
not forget that the upper caste still has power and influence in the
United States. Many castes are organized into associations
preserved for members of a particular caste.229 The most
prominent and powerful Hindu advocacy organization in the
United States, the Hindu American Foundation (“HAF”), denies
that caste bias occurs in Hindu advocacy organizations,
suggesting “what some call casteism may be overblown.”230
Congress must be willing to listen to not only those Hindu
organizations like the HAF—which holds the most influence—
but also to the Dalit organizations that feel the brunt of caste
discrimination.
Lastly, the employers who have allowed caste discrimination
in the workplace can lead the fight by implementing workplace
policies that prohibit caste discrimination. These employers
would certainly include tech giants like IBM, Google, or any
other company with a large South Asian workforce. Such private
companies would have the advantage of not needing to jump
through the numerous, difficult hoops required to pass
congressional legislation. Creating these nondiscrimination
policies would also be in the best interest of these companies
because they would face less Title VII litigation and liability.
Further, taking such steps would show not only their employees,
but also the world, that the human dignity of those suffering from
caste discrimination must be respected.
Overall, the aforementioned alternatives are merely ways to
circumvent judicial interpretation. The EEOC and university227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Martin, supra note 223.
Id.
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level alternative would only attempt to persuade the courts that
caste discrimination is an issue that needs to be addressed and
then prohibited, while the congressional alternative would sternly
demand that the courts perform their duty and adhere to the new
legislation.
CONCLUSION
Just as B.R. Ambedkar, the most influential Dalit civil rights
leader, predicted in 1916, caste has become a “world problem” as
Indian migration has spread across the globe.231 In order to
combat this problem, courts need to make affirmative rulings that
caste discrimination is prohibited by Title VII. Specifically,
courts should accept the theory of Intersectionality as a means to
reach such a conclusion because caste is a unique, multidimensional form of discrimination simultaneously overlapping
into potentially all of the protected classes enumerated in Title
VII. Further, this fight should not, and cannot, be confined to the
courtroom if caste discrimination in the United States is to be
stopped. To end the harms of caste discrimination in the
workplace, legislative bodies, agencies, and employers need to
specifically identify caste discrimination as a prohibited practice.
Although caste, like an ancient poisonous tree, will not easily be
uprooted, prohibiting caste discrimination in the American
workplace is a substantial step towards equality for all.

231. ZWICK-MAITREYI ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.

